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Abstract: The ‘one-person one-vote principle’ (OPOV) seems to be an intuitively appealing 
principle, one that is procedurally fair by ensuring equality in votes for all and contributes to the 
proper functioning of democratic states.  Although commonly cited as a cornerstone of 
democracy, this article argues that OPOV can be a dangerous principle in societies divided by 
group conflict.  Minorities face permanent exclusion, and thus cannot protect their own interests, 
leading to resentment and destabilization.  Moreover, deviation from OPOV is not uncommon in 
political accommodation, especially in federal arrangements.  Opponents of deviation argue that 
it is both undemocratic and dysfunctional having potentially damaging implications for 
reconciliation.  This article examines these claims in the case of Cyprus under the federal 
arrangements of the Annan plan.  After discussing federalism and Cypriot politics, the article 
analyses philosophical and international positions on deviation from OPOV in order to assess 
whether deviation can be considered undemocratic, arguing that whilst not always procedurally 
fair or equal, deviation should be considered democratic if it encourages the effective 
participation of minorities.  The article then examines the provisions within the Annan Plan to 
argue that its deviations from the OPOV principle do not hinder its functionality.  The article 
concludes by arguing federalism and deviation from OPOV encourage political accommodation 
and offer the best chance of reconciliation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
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Introduction 
Creative institutional design rather than adherence to rigid institutional structures and 
international principles is increasingly becoming a promising way of fostering 
reconciliation and political accommodation within ethnically divided societies (Reilly 
2011, 3).  This article focuses on deviation from the ‘one-person one-vote’ principle in 
the Annan plan as a potential method of creative institutional design in Cyprus to 
overcome division.  Although a seemingly natural method of political representation, 
deviation from one-person one-vote (OPOV) can allow for more effective participation 
of minorities, in this case the Turkish Cypriots, which may develop into cooperative 
relationships with other groups.  Opponents of deviation argue it is undemocratic and 
dysfunctional, thus it may exacerbate conflict between groups. 
Instances of group strife can pose problems for the establishment and maintenance of 
democracy (Lijphart 2004, 96).  Proponents of OPOV and proceduralist democracy 
argue that the ‘rules of the game’ will allow groups a fair and equal chance of attaining 
power in the next elections, which is not only ‘democratic’ but will also reassure groups 
out of power.  However, OPOV does not alleviate the problems for small minority 
groups that face permanent exclusion, lack effective representation or participation, 
such as the estimated 18% Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus.  In situations of group 
conflict there is a tendency to conflate inclusion/exclusion in the government with 
inclusion/exclusion in the community (Horowitz, 1993: 18-19).  Thus majoritarian 
democracy may not be able to accommodate minority groups, instead, adherence to 
OPOV may exacerbate existing cleavages and destabilize the political system 
(Loizides, 2010: 5). 
In light of these observations deviation from the OPOV principle may be required.  
Deviation occurs in one of the most familiar institutional designs proscribed in situations 
of group conflict, and indeed in Cyprus, federalism.  A common feature of the federalist 
political system is a bicameral legislature, where the lower chamber is based on 
representation by population, and the upper chamber on equal (or increased) 
representation of the constituent units, whose boundaries can be drawn to make 
national minorities regional majorities.  Federalism’s upper chamber often clearly 
deviates from the OPOV principle by weighting votes differently depending on the sub-
national entity of residence, usually over-representing smaller units.  For example in 
the US Senate, California’s approximately 37,000,000 people have two 
representatives, the same number for Wyoming’s approximately 545,000 people.  
Given that there is significant diversity, in size and demographics among units in 
almost all federations, federalism will necessarily deviate from OPOV.  Indeed, forms of 
‘asymmetric federalism’ that treat units differently in representation (and other ways) 
may be more apt in conflict regulation (Ghai, 2002: 158-159).  In contrast to critics of 
the federal Annan plan Niyazi Kizilyurek (2007) postulates that Cyprus requires group-
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differentiated rights (including Turkish Cypriot over-representation in some institutions) 
to accommodate fears of Greek Cypriot domination (estimated 80% of the population), 
and the overall functionality of the plan.  This article argues that deviation is required 
for the effective participation and articulation of group interests in central government, 
and thus political accommodation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.     
1.  Federalism in Cyprus 
Federalism remains firmly rooted within the social discourse and political reality in 
Cyprus.  Federalism emerged as the solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’ chiefly because 
of ‘facts’ established by recent Cypriot history.  Cyprus represents a peculiar case 
whereby both nationalisms on the island did not seek nation-states on Cypriot soil.  
Both demonstrated an ‘Anschluss-nationalismus’ (union with the motherland), whereby 
the Greek Cypriots pursued enosis (union) with Greece as part of their anti-colonial 
struggle against British imperial rule, whereas nationalist Turkish Cypriot rhetoric 
stressed kinship with Turkey.  Fearing for their security and identity in a potentially 
Greek state, the Turkish Cypriots advocated taksim (partition) for the north to be ruled 
by Turkey.  Thus mutually antagonistic identities and nationalisms existed on the 
island. 
The 1959 London-Zurich Agreements were signed between Britain, Greece and 
Turkey, granting a heavily curtailed “independence” to Cyprus, notably forbidding 
enosis and taksim in the 1960 constitution (Guelke, 2001).  The new political 
arrangements were consociational, with a grand coalition, vetoes and proportionality 
(70,30 in most institutions).  Independence had been the goal of neither of the 
communities, and both enosis and taksim ideologies continued to exert influence on 
political life (ibid).  The 1960 arrangement accommodated separate collective identities 
without having constructed a common sense of citizenship (Kizilyurek, 2007).  The 
arrangement effectively ended in 1963, when after debilitating deadlock, Greek Cypriot 
President Archbishop Makarios III proposed amendments to the constitution that would 
remove Turkish Cypriot veto rights and their over-representation in civil service and 
governmental institutions.  This provoked many of the Turkish Cypriot minority fears of 
domination, sparking inter-communal violence and increased segregation with the 
Turkish Cypriots being forced into enclaves.  Fighting between rival paramilitary groups 
EOKA (Greek Cypriot hardliners) and TMT (Turkish Cypriot hardliners), reported ethnic 
expulsions and cleansing, created numerous refugees and displaced persons.  On 20 
July 1974 the Turkish military invaded after a coup of Makarios by Greek Cypriot 
hardliners (EOKA B) with the support of the Greek junta.  Turkey feared what the newly 
installed President Nicos Sampson may do to the Turkish Cypriots in pursuit of enosis, 
which Makarios had seemingly abandoned several years earlier.  The result was the 
partition, with the Turks controlling 37% of land in the north of the island.  Many Turkish 
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Cypriots moved north into the homes of displaced Greek Cypriots who had fled south, 
and few Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots remained on the ‘wrong side’ of the Green 
Line.    
Subsequent searches for accommodation have focused on reunification of the island 
whilst allowing both Cypriot communities a degree of autonomy.  Kizilyurek (2007) 
argues that any accommodation has to deal with fears of domination and separation, 
on a basis of equality, whilst recognizing both individual and collective rights.  
Federalism in the form a ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ emerged as the most viable 
solution.  A federal state, bi-zonal in terms of territory and bi-communal in terms of its 
constitutional aspects, based on the political equality of two communities under shared 
sovereignty are the essential parameters of the negotiations (Sözen and Özersay, 
2007: 125).  Federalism’s conflict regulating potential has been questioned chiefly 
because of the threat of secession and the problems intermingling communities pose to 
drawing entity boundaries (McGarry and O’Leary; 1993: 34; Nordlinger, 1972; O’Leary, 
2001: 49-52).  Nevertheless, these concerns are relatively minor in the Cyprus case.  
Firstly, Turkish Cypriot isolation due to the international community’s rejection of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (declared in 1983) means any attempt to secede 
from a future federal Cyprus will be an unviable and unattractive option.  Secondly, the 
‘facts on-the-ground’ post-1974 and agreement from the two communities allow the 
possibility of creating two federal zones with Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
majorities, but without restricting human rights and the right of return for refugees.  
Rather than establishing two separate zones, the federal arrangement proposed for 
Cyprus allows for refugee return and features a boundary re-adjustment, reducing the 
majority Turkish Cypriot zone.  The right of return is particularly dear to Greek Cypriots 
wishing to return to the north.  Greek Cypriot return could be linked to incentives for 
Turkish Cypriots, such as naturalization of Turkish settlers, creating a ‘win-win’ 
scenario for both communities.  Turkish Cypriot demographic fears are further allayed 
by the fact that all 100,000 Greek Cypriot refugees and their descendants could be 
accommodated in Turkish Cypriot areas without rising above 27% of the population 
(Loizides and Antoniades, 2009).  These parameters have been established in talks 
with the United Nations, through the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, the ‘Set 
of Ideas’ in 1989 culminating most recently in the Annan plans 2002-2004.  The ‘United 
Cyprus Republic’ proposed by Annan would be an asymmetric federation with each 
national community enjoying autonomy and group-differentiated rights both within their 
federal units and at a national level.  Opponents of its deviations from OPOV argue that 
it is undemocratic and dysfunctional with problematic implications for eventual 
reconciliation.  This article looks at each claim in turn. 
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2. Deviation from the ‘one-person one-vote principle’ is undemocratic 
Although several researchers have attempted to measure democracy, there is little 
consensus on its definitions and principles (Kekic, 2007).  Evaluating deviation in the 
Annan plan through binary ‘undemocratic’ or ‘democratic’ readings risks masking how 
deviation may satisfy some principles of democracy at the expense of others.  Group 
conflict demands we make pragmatic choices about which measures of democracy we 
wish to address.  Both (a) philosophical arguments and (b) international legal principles 
reflect the contested nature of this prioritization.  This article argues that in situations of 
group conflict, ‘effective participation’ is a more salient requirement than procedural 
equality.  Majoritarian conceptions of democracy in Cyprus are clearly problematic 
given its history and demographic make-up.  Deviation from OPOV to ensure effective 
participation is not only democratic but by creating incentives for both parties to operate 
the settlement effectively, it can be reconciliatory through developing higher levels of 
interaction and cooperation. 
a) Philosophical Arguments 
Classical liberalism defends the OPOV principle on the grounds of procedural equality, 
whereby all individuals can vote and know that their vote counts equally.  This allows 
for free and fair elections to take place, which are a prerequisite for democracy.  Any 
deviation or mal-apportionment is a challenge to this democratic fairness and can be 
destabilizing (Snyder and Samuels 2001, 146-147).  The right to vote is a universal and 
individual one, with a long lineage in the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution.  OPOV is equal in the sense of ‘sameness’ rather than recognition of 
difference which classical liberals reject as unattainable (Rae 1981, 451).  There is no 
need to exercise the right as a group because people’s cultural membership and 
identities are protected by the common rights of citizenship and state neutrality (Barry 
2000).  Recognition in the political system may reify and institutionalize divisive group 
identities.  Thus OPOV is democratic because it is procedurally fair and does not 
unequally privilege any group over another. 
Richard Snyder and David Samuels (2001, 149) rail against the disproportionate 
translation of votes into seats: “Where formal electoral rules lead to unfair electoral 
results, even games that do abide by the rules may be undemocratic”.  While Snyder 
and Samuels were arguing for more stringent adherence to OPOV, a different school of 
academics use the same arguments against OPOV.  They question whether OPOV 
affords disadvantaged minority groups effective representation (Kymlicka 1995; Phillips 
1994).  Effective participation is also a key tenet of democracy, so that deviation to 
achieve this goal can be considered democratic.  Effective participation is also more 
salient in the democratic balance than classical liberal conceptions of procedural 
equality in the accommodation of group conflict.  Within the liberal tradition, academics 
like Will Kymlicka argue that group rights are not necessarily incompatible with 
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individual rights.  Liberal multiculturalism argues for ‘equality as difference’, in that “true 
equality requires not identical treatment, but rather a differentiated treatment in order to 
accommodate differential needs” (1995, 113).  Differentiated treatment under Annan 
may include special rights beyond the common individual rights of citizenship which 
deviate from OPOV.  Rather than the state remaining neutral, which Kymlicka (1995, 
107-110) argues is incoherent as the state unavoidably promotes certain identities, the 
state should be ‘evenhanded’, sensitive rather than indifferent to competing claims for 
recognition (Carens 2000, 12).  Multiculturalism thus prioritizes different measures of 
democracy than classical liberalism, allowing for deviation from OPOV that may not be 
strictly procedurally fair and equal, yet ensures effective participation.  An insightful 
article by Nicos Trimikliniotis (2009, 116) argues that treating these methods “as an 
undemocratic ‘distortion’ or ‘deviation’ from the majoritarian principle of ‘the will of the 
people’ is to deny any accommodation to the problem”.  This article agrees, arguing 
effective participation, rather than the procedural equality of all groups under the Annan 
plan, is more likely to foster cooperation and reconciliation. 
b) International Legal Principles 
The international community and its norms can define the scope of possible solutions 
to group conflict problems.  Norms are not static, yet they largely derive from legal 
principles.  Ahmet Sözen (2004) argues that the Annan plan and the international 
community’s approach to the Cyprus problem reflects the norm of territorial integrity 
and the desire to avoid further fragmentation of the international system, focusing its 
efforts on political accommodation and multi-ethnic co-existence.  The international 
community will also have a normative bearing on whether deviation from the OPOV 
principle should be considered undemocratic.  Oddly, Annan appears ‘out of step’ with 
international norms and texts on OPOV.  The international community largely echoes 
the classical liberalist position.  For example, the Venice Commission’s report (2008: 3) 
on the permissibility of ‘dual voting’ for national minorities, argued that the Council of 
Europe would be ill-advised to weaken “the fundamental principle of democracy: 
equality of the right to vote”.  Dual voting was rejected as it afforded some voters 
greater weight than others, compromising the guarantee of ‘universal and equal 
suffrage’ under Article 25 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
International legal principles implicate deviation as undemocratic on the basis of 
weakening equality afforded to voters by the OPOV principle. Nevertheless, the Venice 
Commission allows that the OPOV principle is not absolute: 
“Exceptions, restrictions and variations are accepted if their purpose is lawful 
and necessary and their method chosen is proportional to the outcome sought” 
(Durrieu 2007, 7; bold and underlining in original) 
It is not difficult to imagine that deviation as a method of political accommodation may 
warrant the ‘exception’ label.  In addition, Dr. Fernand de Varennes argues that the 
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right of equal suffrage is “not so rigid” in international law.  Article 2 of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities clarifies how this right should be interpreted in relation to 
minorities.  Articles 2(2) and 2(3) state that minorities have the “right to participate 
effectively” (1998; my emphasis) in public life and in decisions at national and regional 
levels.  Effective participation of minorities also appears in Article 15 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and in the Venice Commission’s 
report itself: 
“According to the Court of Human Rights, such alternatives permit difference 
treatment of minorities to enable them to participate effectively in public life” 
(Durrieu, 2007: 7; bold and underlining in original) 
The Commission proclaims that this is the “key to a stable and peaceful society” 
(Durrieu, 2007: 9).  International legal principles are thus not absolute with regards to 
deviation.  The emphasis on effective participation evokes liberal multiculturalist 
arguments.  It is perhaps a curiosity that with so many federations throughout the world 
that deviation is still considered an “exception”.  Rigid adherence to international legal 
texts may prevent creative institutional design in situations of group conflict.  While the 
particular deviations in Cyprus could be considered ‘exceptional’ to that case, the 
international community should be willing to consider deviation in general as a measure 
of accommodation in group conflict.  Annan could be representative of the international 
community moving away from rigid adherence toward creative institutional design.  
More recent negotiations in Cyprus also point in this direction, where it has been 
proposed that Greek Cypriots become a 20% electoral minority of Turkish Cypriots in 
the election of the Vice President to match the Turkish Cypriot participation in the 
election of President (Loizides 2010, 1).  This article argues that the effective 
participation of minorities, such as the Turkish Cypriots is more pertinent for political 
accommodation than the procedurally equal OPOV principle, and that deviation to 
achieve this through over-representation in federal institutions should not be 
considered undemocratic nor necessarily an exception. 
3. Deviation from the ‘one-person one-vote principle’ is dysfunctional 
It may seem counter-intuitive to examine the functionality of deviation from the OPOV 
principle in the Annan plan.  It has yet come to fruition after 76% of Greek Cypriots 
rejected it in the 2004 referendum.  Furthermore, political scientists are wary about 
overstating the potential effects that institutions may have on political behaviour and 
thus its presumed functionality (Bieber 2010).  Nevertheless, Giovanni Sartori contends 
that constitutions are ‘predictable’ because they act as pathways which structure and 
discipline decision-making (in Trimikliniotis 2009, 116).  This article is more inclined 
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towards Sartori’s argument.  The ethos underlying the Annan Plan is worth quoting at 
length as it influences the functionality assessment: 
“My [Kofi Annan’s] proposal to find a way through this cluster of issues was 
inspired by the need to find a form of government which (a) reflected and 
guaranteed the political equality of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots but 
also reflected in a democratic manner the significantly larger numbers of Greek 
Cypriot citizens; and (b) carried cast-iron guarantees against domination while 
ensuring that the government would function effectively” (UNSC 2003, 18; 
emphasis G.M.) 
Annan thus tries to find a balance in terms of representation of the two communities 
despite demographic disparities and preventing domination via veto rights.  These are 
not the only federal arrangements under the plan but they are arguably most crucial to 
Annan’s reconciliatory potential.  The integrationist critique that by institutionalizing 
ethnicities we reify and exacerbate these identities is noteworthy (Horowitz 2002).  
However, this article is of the view that non-recognition institutionally of the rival 
communities in Cyprus, particularly the Turkish Cypriots, would make the federal 
institutions dysfunctional, intensifying Turkish Cypriot fears of domination.  The balance 
underlying Annan’s ethos justifies deviation from the OPOV principle in certain 
instances in order to enhance the functionality of the agreement. 
The Annan plan is typical of other federal and consociational institutional designs that 
deviate from OPOV in terms of proportionality through disproportionate representation 
in favour of the minority (Lijphart 1979; Schneckener 2002, 220).  Indeed, “federal 
failures primarily occur because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal 
level of government” (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, 34).  Annan compensates for the 
demographic inferiority of the Turkish Cypriots, in the legislature whereby the 48-
member upper chamber (Senate) of the bicameral legislature is composed equally of 
both communities and Turkish Cypriots are guaranteed at least 25% of the seats in the 
48-member Chamber of Deputies (UNSC 2003, 19).  Seat allocations or thresholds 
that over-represent the minority are not uncommon e.g. in Slovenia, Italian (0.11% of 
the population) and Hungarian (0.32%) minorities have dual voting rights whereby they 
vote in the general election as well as special lists that guarantee a Italian and 
Hungarian member of parliament (Venice Commission 2008, 3).   
The ‘grand coalition’ in the executive Presidential Council is also disproportionate, 
over-representing the Turkish Cypriots, with 2 out of the 6 members.  The rotating chair 
principle allows a Turkish Cypriot member of the Council to represent the Council as 
Head of State a third of the time.  Inclusion in the Executive and rotating chairs are not 
without international precedent in group conflict.  In Northern Ireland, the 10-member 
Executive Committee’s positions are allocated via the d’Hondt mechanism which 
promotes inclusion of both communities and the moderate and hardline positions within 
those communities (Wilson 2001, 74).  The Dayton Agreement stipulated that the chair 
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of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to rotate between the elected 
Bosniak (43%), Serb (31%) and Croat (17%) representatives on 8-month terms for four 
years.  Despite some turbulence in the formative years of both cases, each 
arrangement has remained in effect, indicating the functionality of each arrangement, if 
not allaying integrationist fears of its reconciliatory potential.   
Additionally, the Annan plan deviates from OPOV in representation by recognizing the 
Turkish Cypriot minority as a majority in its federal sub-unit.  The practice of 
redistricting is commonplace in federal arrangements (Kymlicka 1995), but the 
guarantee of segmental autonomy in Cyprus has been criticized for its effective 
recognition of an ‘illegitimate entity’ in the north of the island and by ‘ratifying’ the 
immoral means that achieved it (Anderson 2008; Emilianides 2009, 97).  Nevertheless, 
the Greek Cypriots made the ‘historic compromise’ by accepting federal arrangements, 
thus while objections to the means that established Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
near-homogeneous federal units are important moral arguments, federal institutions 
are the reality (Solomides 2010).  The over-representation of Turkish Cypriots can be 
seen as the result of the balance sought in Annan between political equality of Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots whilst recognizing Greek Cypriot demographic superiority 
(UNSC 2003, 18).  Klearchos A. Kyriakides (2009, 68-69) argues that the Annan plan is 
imbalanced and “intentionally dysfunctional” because it ‘blunts’ the supremacy of the 
majority.  Indeed, the 1960 constitution over-representation has been held partially 
responsible for its downfall (Schneckener 2002).  In contrast, this article argues the 
plan is functional because of the nuanced balance outlined, ensuring the Turkish 
Cypriots interests are effectively recognized and cannot be outvoted by the majority.  
Annan also provides enough incentives for Greek Cypriots to accept Turkish Cypriot 
over-representation and veto rights. 
One of the most contentious aspects of the functionality of the Annan plan is the 
provision of veto rights because they “blunt” the supremacy of the Greek Cypriot 
majority.  According to Annan (UNSC 2003, 15), the idea that no decision could be 
taken by one constituent state and no single person could veto decisions and block the 
functionality of the state “run like a golden thread throughout the plan”.  Veto rights are 
more commonly associated with consociationalism, yet federalism may also contain its 
own veto points.  The informal ‘entity veto’, or sub-state veto over central state 
proposals are common to most federations e.g. amendment of the states constitution 
may require entity consent.  Annan goes further than most federations in this regard, 
providing vetoes via special majorities of two-fifths on measures deemed of ‘vital 
interest’ and on the Presidential Council where any majority must include at least one 
Turkish Cypriot (ibid: 19).  Achilles C. Emilianides (2009, 101) argues that this latter 
veto prevents a functional decision-maker in the executive, causing deadlock to 
become normal.  Although veto rights are applicable to both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, they are inevitably weighted towards the minority.  The power to block 
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decisions and legislation by an 18% minority seems prima facie a potentially 
dysfunctional deviation from OPOV.  Presidential and Vice-Presidential veto powers 
under the 1960 constitution were blamed for blockage and paralysis that ultimately 
brought down the political system (Schneckener 2002, 222).   
Nevertheless, political institutions must be contextualized.  Veto rights, group-
differentiated in the sense they are likely to be utilized more by the Turkish Cypriots, 
are realistic about the situation in Cyprus.  Furthermore, in recognition of instances of 
deadlock, the Supreme Court comprising an equal number of Cypriot judges from the 
two communities and foreign judges appointed by the UN would intervene (Loizides 
2009, 85).  This system has been criticized for violating Cyprus’s sovereignty and 
placing too much power in the hands of unelected judges (Anderson 2008; Kyriakides 
2009).  Whilst this judicial arbitration proposal is not ideal, it is not uncommon for the 
legal branch of government to have such a powerful say in federal systems and such 
mechanisms have been used effectively elsewhere.  In South Tyrol, parliamentary 
language groups can call upon the Italian constitutional court if a law is passed against 
the will of two-thirds of one language group (Schneckener 2002, 221).  Loizides (2009, 
86) argues that minority vetoes could add to the functionality of a peace settlement, 
clarifying “who to listen to, to what extent and under what circumstances”.  Veto rights 
can thus have a preventative effect, inducing accommodation by making the costs of 
dysfunctional and uncooperative behaviour high, incentivizing better relationships 
between the groups.  Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot veto has historical precedent from 
1960.  Repudiation of these rights would be a serious breach of trust, creating 
instability and undermining the functionality of agreement (Kymlicka 1995, 116-119).  
Again Annan sought a balance, providing veto rights that deviate from OPOV as 
guarantees against domination while ensuring that the government would function 
effectively by inducing cooperation and fostering reconciliation, providing an arbitration 
mechanism if deadlock arose (UNSC 2003, 18). 
Conclusion 
This article argues that deviation from the OPOV principle within the federal framework 
of the Annan plan can be both democratic and functional.  Furthermore, deviation can 
contribute to reconciliation by the effective participation of both communities which will 
develop better relationships between the communities.  However, deviation should be 
context-specific in regard to its methods of accommodation (Bieber and Wolff 2005. 
362; Carens 2000, 14; Kymlicka 1995, 110 and 141), with the proposals in the Annan 
plan unlikely to be replicated verbatim in other cases of group conflict.  Certainly a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach is not recommended.  Central to the argument of this article is the 
need for creative institutional design and deviation from OPOV in situations of group 
conflict.  OPOV is compatible with democracy in the abstract but not conducive to 
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multiethnic inclusiveness, creating instability (Horowitz 1993, 28).  With regard to the 
‘deviation as undemocratic’ question, this article argues that effective participation is 
more pertinent in cases of group conflict than the procedurally fair and equal measure 
embodied by OPOV.  The balance in prioritization of these measures finds contending 
voices in philosophical arguments and international legal principles.  Crucially, the 
Annan Plan in Cyprus does deviate from the principle in several instances of its 
architecture.  Admittedly, federalism and mechanisms for accommodating group 
conflict that deviate from OPOV have mixed records elsewhere (Bieber 2010; Grant 
2007).  The challenge for Cyprus and the Annan plan is to ensure that group-
differentiated rights, such as deviation from OPOV, can be reconciled with a common 
political culture that binds federal states (Kizilyurek 2007).  This article argues that 
operation of Annan’s federal arrangements is the most likely method of fostering such 
an identity.  Conclusive evidence of the functionality and reconciliatory potential of 
deviation and federalism will only be established ‘on-the-ground’ and several years 
after its implementation.  If both communities operate the federal settlement with an 
ethos of good faith and willingness to compromise, the balance within the Annan plan 
and its deviations from OPOV are a promising method of political accommodation for 
the Cyprus problem. 
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